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Authorities concerned will be American, and we have not yet reached the stage of discussing such matters with the Americans. It does seen clear, however, that, for this reason, the complications in the case of Hong Kong and Borneo will be even greater than in the case of Burma and Malaya in that there will not be such easily workable machinery for deciding what is and is not to be a military responsibility.
In the case of Boreo there is the further complication that (unlike Malaya) the Colonial Office has not at present any access to the funds of the North Borneo and Sarawak Governments. It will be a matter for consideration (and negotiation with the British North Borneo Company and the Rajah respectively) whether and to what extent these funds should be used for financing the Civil Affairs requirements of these territories during the period of military administration.
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There are the further considerations that much of the material which will be required for the use of the Civil Affairs Administration in Borneo will be in the form of consumable goods and that some of the capital equipment will not be of value to the Oivil Governments when they take over the Administration from the Military. It will be for consideration to what extent such expenditure should be regarded as chargeable to the Civil Governments of the territories concerned.
These matters will take some time to settle, and we are inclined to think that such negotiations should not be begun until we have authority from the Cabinet to enter into discussions about the future of these
territories.
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.